Merge branch 'crypto' of github.com:beardog108/onionr into crypto
This commit is contained in:
Kevin Froman
commit
b6cfe0154d
@ -1,71 +1,48 @@
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# Onionr Protocol Spec
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# Onionr Protocol Spec v2
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A social network/microblogging platform for Tor & I2P
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Draft Dec 25 2017
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A P2P platform for Tor & I2P
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# Overview
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Onionr is an encrypted microblogging & mailing system designed in the spirit of Twitter.
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There are no central servers and all traffic is peer to peer by default (routed via Tor or I2P).
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User IDs are simply Tor onion service/I2P host id + PGP fingerprint.
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Clients consolidate feeds from peers into 1 “timeline” using RSS format.
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Private messages are only accessible by the intended peer based on the PGP id.
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Onionr is not intended to be a replacement for Ricochet, OnionShare, or Briar.
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All traffic is over onion/I2P because if only some was, then that would make that traffic inherently suspicious.
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User IDs are simply Tor onion service/I2P host id + Ed25519 key fingerprint.
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Private blocks are only able to be read by the intended peer.
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All traffic is over Tor/I2P, connecting only to Tor onion and I2P hidden services.
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## Goals:
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• Selective sharing of information with friends & public
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• Selective sharing of information
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• Secure & semi-anonymous direct messaging
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• Forward secrecy
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• Defense in depth
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• Data should be secure for years to come, quantum safe (though not necessarily every “layer”)
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• Data should be secure for years to come
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• Decentralization
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* Avoid browser-based exploits that plague similar software
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* Avoid timing attacks & unexpected metadata leaks
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## Assumptions:
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• Tor & I2P’s transport protocols & AES-256 are not broken, sha3-512 2nd preimage attacks will remain infeasible indefinitely
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• All traffic is logged indefinitely by powerful adversaries
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## Protocol
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Clients MUST use HTTP(s) to communicate with one another to maintain compatibility cross platform. HTTPS is recommended, but HTTP is acceptable because Tor & I2P provide transport layer security.
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Onionr nodes use HTTP (over Tor/I2P) to exchange keys, metadata, and blocks. Blocks are identified by their sha3_256 hash. Nodes sync a table of blocks hashes and attempt to download blocks they do not yet have from random peers.
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## Connections
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When a node first comes online, it attempts to bootstrap using a default list provided by a client.
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When two peers connect, they exchange PGP public keys and then generate a shared AES-SHA3-512 HMAC token. These keys are stored in a peer database until expiry.
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HMAC tokens are regenerated either every X many communications with a peer or every X minutes. Every 10MB or every 2 hours is a recommended default.
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All valid requests with HMAC should be recorded until used HMAC's expiry to prevent replay attacks.
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Peer Types
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* Friends:
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* Encrypted ‘friends only’ posts to one another
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* Usually less strict rate & storage limits
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* OPTIONALLY sign one another’s keys. Users may not want to do this in order to avoid exposing their entire friends list.
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• Strangers:
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* Used for storage of encrypted or public information
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* Can only read public posts
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* Usually stricter rate & storage limits
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## Data Storage/Delivery
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Posts (public or friends only) are stored across the network.
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Private messages SHOULD be delivered directly if both peers are online, otherwise stored in the network.
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Data SHOULD be stored in an entirely encrypted state when a client is offline, including metadata. Data SHOULD be stored in a minimal size with garbage data to ensure some level of plausible deniablity.
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Data SHOULD be stored as long as the node’s user prefers and only erased once disk quota is reached due to new data.
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Posts
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Posts can contain text and images. All posts MUST be time stamped.
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Images SHOULD not be displayed by non-friends by default, to prevent unwanted viewing of offensive material & to reduce attack surface.
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All received posts must be verified to be stored and/or displayed to the user.
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When a node first comes online, it attempts to bootstrap using a default list provided by a client.
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When two peers connect, they exchange Ed25519 keys (if applicable) then Salsa20 keys.
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All data being transfered MUST be encrypted to the end node receiving the data, then the data MUST be encrypted the node(s) transporting/storing the data,
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Salsa20 keys are regenerated either every X many communications with a peer or every X minutes.
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Posts have two settings:
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• Friends only:
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◦ Posts MUST be encrypted to all trusted peers via AES256-HMAC-SHA256 and PGP signed (signed before encryption) and time stamped to prevent replaying. A temporary RSA key for use in every post (or message) is exchanged every X many configured post (or message), for use in addition with PGP and the HMAC.
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• Public:
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◦ Posts MUST be PGP signed, and MUST NOT use any encryption.
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## Private Messages
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Every 100kb or every 2 hours is a recommended default.
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Private messages are messages that can have attached images. They MUST be encrypted via AES256-HMAC-SHA256 and PGP signed (signed before encryption) and time stamped to prevent replaying. A temporary EdDSA key for use in every message is exchanged every X many configured messages (or posts), for use in addition with PGP and the HMAC.
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When both peers are online messages SHOULD be dispatched directly between peers.
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All messages must be verified prior to being displayed.
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All valid requests with HMAC should be recorded until used HMAC's expiry to prevent replay attacks.
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Peer Types
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* Friends:
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* Encrypted ‘friends only’ posts to one another
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* Usually less strict rate & storage limits
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* Strangers:
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* Used for storage of encrypted or public information
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* Can only read public posts
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* Usually stricter rate & storage limits
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Clients SHOULD allow configurable message padding.
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## Spam mitigation
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To send or receive data, a node can optionally request that the other node generate a hash that when in hexadecimal representation contains a random string at a random location in the string. Clients will configure what difficulty to request, and what difficulty is acceptable for themselves to perform. Difficulty should correlate with recent network & disk usage and data size. Friends can be configured to have less strict (to non existent) limits, separately from strangers. (proof of work).
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@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
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import flask
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from flask import request, Response, abort
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from multiprocessing import Process
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import configparser, sys, random, threading, hmac, hashlib, base64, time, math, gnupg, os, logger
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import configparser, sys, random, threading, hmac, hashlib, base64, time, math, os, logger
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from core import Core
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import onionrutils, onionrcrypto
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@ -140,8 +140,6 @@ class API:
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resp = Response(self._utils.getBlockDBHash())
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elif action == 'getBlockHashes':
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resp = Response(self._core.getBlockList())
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elif action == 'getPGP':
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resp = Response(self._utils.exportMyPubkey())
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# setData should be something the communicator initiates, not this api
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elif action == 'getData':
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resp = self._core.getData(data)
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@ -40,13 +40,6 @@ class OnionrCommunicate:
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self.peerData = {} # Session data for peers (recent reachability, speed, etc)
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# get our own PGP fingerprint
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fingerprintFile = 'data/own-fingerprint.txt'
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if not os.path.exists(fingerprintFile):
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self._core.generateMainPGP(torID)
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with open(fingerprintFile,'r') as f:
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self.pgpOwnFingerprint = f.read()
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logger.info('My PGP fingerprint is ' + logger.colors.underline + self.pgpOwnFingerprint + logger.colors.reset + logger.colors.fg.green + '.')
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if os.path.exists(self._core.queueDB):
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self._core.clearDaemonQueue()
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while True:
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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'''
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import sqlite3, os, sys, time, math, gnupg, base64, tarfile, getpass, simplecrypt, hashlib, nacl, logger
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import sqlite3, os, sys, time, math, base64, tarfile, getpass, simplecrypt, hashlib, nacl, logger
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#from Crypto.Cipher import AES
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#from Crypto import Random
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import netcontroller
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@ -38,10 +38,8 @@ class Core:
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'''
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self.queueDB = 'data/queue.db'
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self.peerDB = 'data/peers.db'
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self.ownPGPID = ''
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self.blockDB = 'data/blocks.db'
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self.blockDataLocation = 'data/blocks/'
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self.gpgHome = './data/pgp/'
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self._utils = onionrutils.OnionrUtils(self)
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self._crypto = onionrcrypto.OnionrCrypto(self)
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@ -55,28 +53,6 @@ class Core:
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return
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def generateMainPGP(self, myID):
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'''
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Generate the main PGP key for our client. Should not be done often.
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Uses own PGP home folder in the data/ directory
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'''
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gpg = gnupg.GPG(homedir=self.gpgHome)
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input_data = gpg.gen_key_input(key_type="RSA", key_length=1024, name_real=myID, name_email='anon@onionr', testing=True)
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key = gpg.gen_key(input_data)
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logger.info("Generating PGP key, this will take some time..")
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while key.status != "key created":
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time.sleep(0.5)
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print(key.status)
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logger.info("Finished generating PGP key")
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# Write the key
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myFingerpintFile = open('data/own-fingerprint.txt', 'w')
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myFingerpintFile.write(key.fingerprint)
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myFingerpintFile.close()
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return
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def addPeer(self, peerID, name=''):
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'''
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Add a peer by their ID, with an optional name, to the peer database
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@ -104,8 +80,7 @@ class Core:
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c.execute('''CREATE TABLE peers(
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ID text not null,
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name text,
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pgpKey text,
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hmacKey text,
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pubkey text,
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blockDBHash text,
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forwardKey text,
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dateSeen not null,
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@ -335,7 +310,6 @@ class Core:
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id text 0
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name text, 1
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pgpKey text, 2
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hmacKey text, 3
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blockDBHash text, 4
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forwardKey text, 5
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@ -346,7 +320,7 @@ class Core:
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conn = sqlite3.connect(self.peerDB)
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c = conn.cursor()
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command = (peer,)
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infoNumbers = {'id': 0, 'name': 1, 'pgpKey': 2, 'hmacKey': 3, 'blockDBHash': 4, 'forwardKey': 5, 'dateSeen': 6, 'bytesStored': 7, 'trust': 8}
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infoNumbers = {'id': 0, 'name': 1, 'hmacKey': 3, 'blockDBHash': 4, 'forwardKey': 5, 'dateSeen': 6, 'bytesStored': 7, 'trust': 8}
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info = infoNumbers[info]
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iterCount = 0
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retVal = ''
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@ -369,7 +343,7 @@ class Core:
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c = conn.cursor()
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command = (data, peer)
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# TODO: validate key on whitelist
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if key not in ('id', 'text', 'name', 'pgpKey', 'hmacKey', 'blockDBHash', 'forwardKey', 'dateSeen', 'bytesStored', 'trust'):
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if key not in ('id', 'name', 'pubkey', 'blockDBHash', 'forwardKey', 'dateSeen', 'bytesStored', 'trust'):
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raise Exception("Got invalid database key when setting peer info")
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c.execute('UPDATE peers SET ' + key + ' = ? WHERE id=?', command)
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conn.commit()
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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'''
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import nacl, gnupg
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import nacl
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class OnionrCrypto:
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def __init__(self, coreInstance):
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@ -30,14 +30,8 @@ class OnionrCrypto:
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def symmetricPeerDecrypt(self, data, key):
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return
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def rsaEncrypt(self, peer, data):
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return
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def verifyPGP(self, peer, signature):
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'''Verify PGP signed data'''
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gpg = gnupg.GPG(homedir=self._core.gpgHome)
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def generateSymmetric():
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return
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def generateHMAC():
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return
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
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along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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'''
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# Misc functions that do not fit in the main api, but are useful
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import getpass, sys, requests, configparser, os, socket, gnupg, hashlib, logger, sqlite3
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import getpass, sys, requests, configparser, os, socket, hashlib, logger, sqlite3
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if sys.version_info < (3, 6):
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try:
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import sha3
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@ -93,19 +93,6 @@ class OnionrUtils:
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else:
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return True
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def exportMyPubkey(self):
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'''
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Export our PGP key if it exists
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'''
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if not os.path.exists(self.fingerprintFile):
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raise Exception("No fingerprint found, cannot export our PGP key.")
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gpg = gnupg.GPG(homedir='./data/pgp/')
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with open(self.fingerprintFile,'r') as f:
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fingerprint = f.read()
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ascii_armored_public_keys = gpg.export_keys(fingerprint)
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return ascii_armored_public_keys
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def getBlockDBHash(self):
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'''
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Return a sha3_256 hash of the blocks DB
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@ -154,17 +141,6 @@ class OnionrUtils:
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return retVal
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def getPeerPGPFingerprint(self, peer):
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'''
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Get peer's PGP fingerprint
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'''
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retData = ''
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gpg = gnupg.GPG(homedir=self._core.gpgHome)
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for i in gpg.list_keys():
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if peer in i['uids'][0]:
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retData = i['fingerprint']
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return retData
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def validateID(self, id):
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'''
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Validate if a user ID is a valid tor or i2p hidden service
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@ -85,33 +85,6 @@ class OnionrTests(unittest.TestCase):
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else:
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self.assertTrue(False)
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def testPGPGen(self):
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logger.debug('--------------------------')
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logger.info('Running PGP key generation test...')
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if os.path.exists('data/pgp/'):
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self.assertTrue(True)
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else:
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import core, netcontroller
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myCore = core.Core()
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net = netcontroller.NetController(1337)
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net.startTor()
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torID = open('data/hs/hostname').read()
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myCore.generateMainPGP(torID)
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if os.path.exists('data/pgp/'):
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self.assertTrue(True)
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def testHMACGen(self):
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logger.debug('--------------------------')
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logger.info('Running HMAC generation test...')
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# Test if hmac key generation is working
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import core
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myCore = core.Core()
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key = myCore.generateHMAC()
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if len(key) > 10:
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self.assertTrue(True)
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else:
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self.assertTrue(False)
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def testQueue(self):
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logger.debug('--------------------------')
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logger.info('Running daemon queue test...')
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@ -1,10 +1,7 @@
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PyNaCl==1.2.1
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gnupg==2.3.1
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requests==2.12.4
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Flask==0.12.2
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requests==2.18.4
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urllib3==1.22
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simple_crypt==4.1.7
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urllib3==1.19.1
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sha3==0.2.1
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pycrypto==2.6.1
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pynacl==1.2.1
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PySocks==1.6.8
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Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user