From 895b1919fd2ffe6b617e3277d76496f76369671c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kevin Froman Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:31:30 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] removed PGP --- docs/onionr-draft.md | 75 +++++++++++++++--------------------------- onionr/api.py | 4 +-- onionr/communicator.py | 7 ---- onionr/core.py | 34 +++---------------- onionr/onionrcrypto.py | 10 ++---- onionr/onionrutils.py | 26 +-------------- onionr/tests.py | 27 --------------- requirements.txt | 8 ++--- 8 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 155 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/onionr-draft.md b/docs/onionr-draft.md index 26fbf18f..6fb79cbe 100644 --- a/docs/onionr-draft.md +++ b/docs/onionr-draft.md @@ -1,72 +1,49 @@ -# Onionr Protocol Spec +# Onionr Protocol Spec v2 -A social network/microblogging platform for Tor & I2P - -Draft Dec 25 2017 +A P2P platform for Tor & I2P # Overview Onionr is an encrypted microblogging & mailing system designed in the spirit of Twitter. There are no central servers and all traffic is peer to peer by default (routed via Tor or I2P). -User IDs are simply Tor onion service/I2P host id + PGP fingerprint. -Clients consolidate feeds from peers into 1 “timeline” using RSS format. -Private messages are only accessible by the intended peer based on the PGP id. -Onionr is not intended to be a replacement for Ricochet, OnionShare, or Briar. -All traffic is over onion/I2P because if only some was, then that would make that traffic inherently suspicious. +User IDs are simply Tor onion service/I2P host id + Ed25519 key fingerprint. +Private blocks are only able to be read by the intended peer. +All traffic is over Tor/I2P, connecting only to Tor onion and I2P hidden services. + ## Goals: - • Selective sharing of information with friends & public + • Selective sharing of information • Secure & semi-anonymous direct messaging • Forward secrecy • Defense in depth - • Data should be secure for years to come, quantum safe (though not necessarily every “layer”) + • Data should be secure for years to come • Decentralization * Avoid browser-based exploits that plague similar software * Avoid timing attacks & unexpected metadata leaks -## Assumptions: - • Tor & I2P’s transport protocols & AES-256 are not broken, sha3-512 2nd preimage attacks will remain infeasible indefinitely - • All traffic is logged indefinitely by powerful adversaries + ## Protocol -Clients MUST use HTTP(s) to communicate with one another to maintain compatibility cross platform. HTTPS is recommended, but HTTP is acceptable because Tor & I2P provide transport layer security. + +Onionr nodes use HTTP (over Tor/I2P) to exchange keys, metadata, and blocks. Blocks are identified by their sha3_256 hash. Nodes sync a table of blocks hashes and attempt to download blocks they do not yet have from random peers. + ## Connections - When a node first comes online, it attempts to bootstrap using a default list provided by a client. - When two peers connect, they exchange PGP public keys and then generate a shared AES-SHA3-512 HMAC token. These keys are stored in a peer database until expiry. - HMAC tokens are regenerated either every X many communications with a peer or every X minutes. Every 10MB or every 2 hours is a recommended default. - All valid requests with HMAC should be recorded until used HMAC's expiry to prevent replay attacks. - Peer Types - * Friends: - * Encrypted ‘friends only’ posts to one another - * Usually less strict rate & storage limits - * OPTIONALLY sign one another’s keys. Users may not want to do this in order to avoid exposing their entire friends list. - • Strangers: - * Used for storage of encrypted or public information - * Can only read public posts - * Usually stricter rate & storage limits -## Data Storage/Delivery - Posts (public or friends only) are stored across the network. - Private messages SHOULD be delivered directly if both peers are online, otherwise stored in the network. - Data SHOULD be stored in an entirely encrypted state when a client is offline, including metadata. Data SHOULD be stored in a minimal size with garbage data to ensure some level of plausible deniablity. - Data SHOULD be stored as long as the node’s user prefers and only erased once disk quota is reached due to new data. - Posts - Posts can contain text and images. All posts MUST be time stamped. - Images SHOULD not be displayed by non-friends by default, to prevent unwanted viewing of offensive material & to reduce attack surface. - All received posts must be verified to be stored and/or displayed to the user. +When a node first comes online, it attempts to bootstrap using a default list provided by a client. +When two peers connect, they exchange Ed25519 keys (if applicable) then Salsa20 keys. - All data being transfered MUST be encrypted to the end node receiving the data, then the data MUST be encrypted the node(s) transporting/storing the data, +Salsa20 keys are regenerated either every X many communications with a peer or every X minutes. - Posts have two settings: - • Friends only: - ◦ Posts MUST be encrypted to all trusted peers via AES256-HMAC-SHA256 and PGP signed (signed before encryption) and time stamped to prevent replaying. A temporary RSA key for use in every post (or message) is exchanged every X many configured post (or message), for use in addition with PGP and the HMAC. - • Public: - ◦ Posts MUST be PGP signed, and MUST NOT use any encryption. -## Private Messages +Every 100kb or every 2 hours is a recommended default. - Private messages are messages that can have attached images. They MUST be encrypted via AES256-HMAC-SHA256 and PGP signed (signed before encryption) and time stamped to prevent replaying. A temporary EdDSA key for use in every message is exchanged every X many configured messages (or posts), for use in addition with PGP and the HMAC. - When both peers are online messages SHOULD be dispatched directly between peers. - All messages must be verified prior to being displayed. +All valid requests with HMAC should be recorded until used HMAC's expiry to prevent replay attacks. +Peer Types + * Friends: + * Encrypted ‘friends only’ posts to one another + * Usually less strict rate & storage limits + * Strangers: + * Used for storage of encrypted or public information + * Can only read public posts + * Usually stricter rate & storage limits - Clients SHOULD allow configurable message padding. ## Spam mitigation To send or receive data, a node can optionally request that the other node generate a hash that when in hexadecimal representation contains a random string at a random location in the string. Clients will configure what difficulty to request, and what difficulty is acceptable for themselves to perform. Difficulty should correlate with recent network & disk usage and data size. Friends can be configured to have less strict (to non existent) limits, separately from strangers. (proof of work). -Rate limits can be strict, as Onionr is not intended to be an instant messaging application. +Rate limits can be strict, as Onionr is not intended to be an instant messaging application. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/onionr/api.py b/onionr/api.py index 92ba30a1..73c65b48 100755 --- a/onionr/api.py +++ b/onionr/api.py @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import flask from flask import request, Response, abort from multiprocessing import Process -import configparser, sys, random, threading, hmac, hashlib, base64, time, math, gnupg, os, logger +import configparser, sys, random, threading, hmac, hashlib, base64, time, math, os, logger from core import Core import onionrutils, onionrcrypto @@ -140,8 +140,6 @@ class API: resp = Response(self._utils.getBlockDBHash()) elif action == 'getBlockHashes': resp = Response(self._core.getBlockList()) - elif action == 'getPGP': - resp = Response(self._utils.exportMyPubkey()) # setData should be something the communicator initiates, not this api elif action == 'getData': resp = self._core.getData(data) diff --git a/onionr/communicator.py b/onionr/communicator.py index 2e383fb2..7fe5ecd1 100755 --- a/onionr/communicator.py +++ b/onionr/communicator.py @@ -40,13 +40,6 @@ class OnionrCommunicate: self.peerData = {} # Session data for peers (recent reachability, speed, etc) - # get our own PGP fingerprint - fingerprintFile = 'data/own-fingerprint.txt' - if not os.path.exists(fingerprintFile): - self._core.generateMainPGP(torID) - with open(fingerprintFile,'r') as f: - self.pgpOwnFingerprint = f.read() - logger.info('My PGP fingerprint is ' + logger.colors.underline + self.pgpOwnFingerprint + logger.colors.reset + logger.colors.fg.green + '.') if os.path.exists(self._core.queueDB): self._core.clearDaemonQueue() while True: diff --git a/onionr/core.py b/onionr/core.py index 93a1bc7c..d1a03b31 100644 --- a/onionr/core.py +++ b/onionr/core.py @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see . ''' -import sqlite3, os, sys, time, math, gnupg, base64, tarfile, getpass, simplecrypt, hashlib, nacl, logger +import sqlite3, os, sys, time, math, base64, tarfile, getpass, simplecrypt, hashlib, nacl, logger #from Crypto.Cipher import AES #from Crypto import Random import netcontroller @@ -38,10 +38,8 @@ class Core: ''' self.queueDB = 'data/queue.db' self.peerDB = 'data/peers.db' - self.ownPGPID = '' self.blockDB = 'data/blocks.db' self.blockDataLocation = 'data/blocks/' - self.gpgHome = './data/pgp/' self._utils = onionrutils.OnionrUtils(self) self._crypto = onionrcrypto.OnionrCrypto(self) @@ -55,28 +53,6 @@ class Core: return - def generateMainPGP(self, myID): - ''' - Generate the main PGP key for our client. Should not be done often. - - Uses own PGP home folder in the data/ directory - ''' - gpg = gnupg.GPG(homedir=self.gpgHome) - input_data = gpg.gen_key_input(key_type="RSA", key_length=1024, name_real=myID, name_email='anon@onionr', testing=True) - key = gpg.gen_key(input_data) - logger.info("Generating PGP key, this will take some time..") - while key.status != "key created": - time.sleep(0.5) - print(key.status) - - logger.info("Finished generating PGP key") - # Write the key - myFingerpintFile = open('data/own-fingerprint.txt', 'w') - myFingerpintFile.write(key.fingerprint) - myFingerpintFile.close() - - return - def addPeer(self, peerID, name=''): ''' Add a peer by their ID, with an optional name, to the peer database @@ -104,8 +80,7 @@ class Core: c.execute('''CREATE TABLE peers( ID text not null, name text, - pgpKey text, - hmacKey text, + pubkey text, blockDBHash text, forwardKey text, dateSeen not null, @@ -335,7 +310,6 @@ class Core: id text 0 name text, 1 - pgpKey text, 2 hmacKey text, 3 blockDBHash text, 4 forwardKey text, 5 @@ -346,7 +320,7 @@ class Core: conn = sqlite3.connect(self.peerDB) c = conn.cursor() command = (peer,) - infoNumbers = {'id': 0, 'name': 1, 'pgpKey': 2, 'hmacKey': 3, 'blockDBHash': 4, 'forwardKey': 5, 'dateSeen': 6, 'bytesStored': 7, 'trust': 8} + infoNumbers = {'id': 0, 'name': 1, 'hmacKey': 3, 'blockDBHash': 4, 'forwardKey': 5, 'dateSeen': 6, 'bytesStored': 7, 'trust': 8} info = infoNumbers[info] iterCount = 0 retVal = '' @@ -369,7 +343,7 @@ class Core: c = conn.cursor() command = (data, peer) # TODO: validate key on whitelist - if key not in ('id', 'text', 'name', 'pgpKey', 'hmacKey', 'blockDBHash', 'forwardKey', 'dateSeen', 'bytesStored', 'trust'): + if key not in ('id', 'name', 'pubkey', 'blockDBHash', 'forwardKey', 'dateSeen', 'bytesStored', 'trust'): raise Exception("Got invalid database key when setting peer info") c.execute('UPDATE peers SET ' + key + ' = ? WHERE id=?', command) conn.commit() diff --git a/onionr/onionrcrypto.py b/onionr/onionrcrypto.py index 79bd339e..e9f89c7c 100644 --- a/onionr/onionrcrypto.py +++ b/onionr/onionrcrypto.py @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this program. If not, see . ''' -import nacl, gnupg +import nacl class OnionrCrypto: def __init__(self, coreInstance): @@ -29,15 +29,9 @@ class OnionrCrypto: def symmetricPeerDecrypt(self, data, key): return - - def rsaEncrypt(self, peer, data): - return - - def verifyPGP(self, peer, signature): - '''Verify PGP signed data''' - gpg = gnupg.GPG(homedir=self._core.gpgHome) def generateSymmetric(): return + def generateHMAC(): return \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/onionr/onionrutils.py b/onionr/onionrutils.py index 619e5927..ba082b98 100644 --- a/onionr/onionrutils.py +++ b/onionr/onionrutils.py @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ along with this program. If not, see . ''' # Misc functions that do not fit in the main api, but are useful -import getpass, sys, requests, configparser, os, socket, gnupg, hashlib, logger, sqlite3 +import getpass, sys, requests, configparser, os, socket, hashlib, logger, sqlite3 if sys.version_info < (3, 6): try: import sha3 @@ -93,19 +93,6 @@ class OnionrUtils: else: return True - def exportMyPubkey(self): - ''' - Export our PGP key if it exists - ''' - if not os.path.exists(self.fingerprintFile): - raise Exception("No fingerprint found, cannot export our PGP key.") - gpg = gnupg.GPG(homedir='./data/pgp/') - with open(self.fingerprintFile,'r') as f: - fingerprint = f.read() - ascii_armored_public_keys = gpg.export_keys(fingerprint) - - return ascii_armored_public_keys - def getBlockDBHash(self): ''' Return a sha3_256 hash of the blocks DB @@ -153,17 +140,6 @@ class OnionrUtils: retVal = False return retVal - - def getPeerPGPFingerprint(self, peer): - ''' - Get peer's PGP fingerprint - ''' - retData = '' - gpg = gnupg.GPG(homedir=self._core.gpgHome) - for i in gpg.list_keys(): - if peer in i['uids'][0]: - retData = i['fingerprint'] - return retData def validateID(self, id): ''' diff --git a/onionr/tests.py b/onionr/tests.py index 8babbdfd..557e8885 100755 --- a/onionr/tests.py +++ b/onionr/tests.py @@ -85,33 +85,6 @@ class OnionrTests(unittest.TestCase): else: self.assertTrue(False) - def testPGPGen(self): - logger.debug('--------------------------') - logger.info('Running PGP key generation test...') - if os.path.exists('data/pgp/'): - self.assertTrue(True) - else: - import core, netcontroller - myCore = core.Core() - net = netcontroller.NetController(1337) - net.startTor() - torID = open('data/hs/hostname').read() - myCore.generateMainPGP(torID) - if os.path.exists('data/pgp/'): - self.assertTrue(True) - - def testHMACGen(self): - logger.debug('--------------------------') - logger.info('Running HMAC generation test...') - # Test if hmac key generation is working - import core - myCore = core.Core() - key = myCore.generateHMAC() - if len(key) > 10: - self.assertTrue(True) - else: - self.assertTrue(False) - def testQueue(self): logger.debug('--------------------------') logger.info('Running daemon queue test...') diff --git a/requirements.txt b/requirements.txt index da4c8869..7f937ff4 100644 --- a/requirements.txt +++ b/requirements.txt @@ -1,10 +1,6 @@ PyNaCl==1.2.1 -gnupg==2.3.1 +requests==2.12.4 Flask==0.12.2 -requests==2.18.4 -urllib3==1.22 simple_crypt==4.1.7 +urllib3==1.19.1 sha3==0.2.1 -pycrypto==2.6.1 -pynacl==1.2.1 -PySocks==1.6.8